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POLLUTION CONTROL-USES OF
CORRECTIVE TAXES RECONSIDERED
JOHN T. WENDERSt
In a recent article in this Journal,' Professor Colin Wright investigates the use of corrective taxes to control pollution. One of his
conclusions is that in certain circumstances the equiproportionate
abatement rule is superior to a single tax as a pollution control
device. I shall argue in this brief note that in the situation analyzed
by Wright a single pollution tax is always superior to the equiproportionate abatement rule. In addition, I shall argue that corrective taxes are superior to other methods of pollution control since
they provide an efficient source of revenue for the pollution control
board and produce a higher rate of change in pollution abatement

technology.
The essence of Wright's argument is that differing sufferer damage
functions for each polluter require that different tax rates be levied
on each polluter. Since multiple tax rates are probably politically
impossible to administer, the best the Pollution Control Board (PCB)
can do is impose a single tax on pollutants. This is necessarily nonoptimal, and Wright correctly demonstrates that under certain circumstances the equiproportionate abatement rule may be superior to
a single tax.
The flaw in this internally correct line of reasoning is that under
the assumptions employed by Wright, damages caused by individual
polluters are logically impossible to estimate. This means that a single
corrective tax can be optimal, and therefore the equiproportionate
abatement rule is rendered always inferior. The two conditions which
make sufferer damage functions for each polluter non-separable are:
(1) a mixing or dispersement of pollutants from several sources so
that the observed level of pollution cannot be attributed to any
single source; and (2) a total damage function for the community
which is non-linear, i.e., which rises faster than the level of
pollution.'
Both of these conditions must prevail for the sufferer damage
function for any single polluter to be indeterminant. If the first
condition does not prevail then any pollution damage can be traced
tAssociate Professor of Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson.
1. Wright, Some Aspects of the Use of Corrective Taxes for ControllingAir Pollution
Emissions, 9 Natural Resources J. 63 (1969).
2. Note the discussion in T. Crocker and A. Rogers, Environmental Economics 127-30

(1971).
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to its source and sufferer damage functions for each polluter thereby
constructed. It would make no difference whether these functions
were linear or not. If the second does not hold, i.e., the total damage
function is linear, then any given increment of pollution, no matter
what the source, would have the same damaging effect, and a damage
function for each polluter could be constructed from a knowledge of
its emission level. On the other hand, when damages rise faster than
the level of pollution, each succeeding increment to the pollution
total has a greater damaging effect but the responsible party cannot
be identified due to the presence of condition one. The damaging
effect of one polluter's emissions is dependent on the level of emissions of other polluters, and therefore sufferer damage functions for
each polluter cannot be constructed.
It is clear that Wright's analysis explicitly assumes both of these
conditions.
After pollutants are emitted from their source they are dispersed in a
manner determined by meteorological conditions, and configurations of the surrounding terrain, and the pollutants themselves, such
that a given emission will affect
various people in different locations
3
and at different intensities.
Throughout this paper I shall assume that ... the increment to total
damages (marginal damages) is positive but increasing. 4
It is most likely the case, . . . that the damage function is not linear
and, in fact, rises quite sharply for increasing pollution levels.5
Under the conditions assumed by Wright, the result is that sufferer
damage functions for each polluter cannot be determined, and therefore conclusions which are based on them are irrelevant. However, it
should be emphasized that the total damage function can be determined. This may not be cheap, but at least it is logically possible to
do so.
Given these conditions, what is the optimal level of pollution? The
answer is rather traditional: pollution should be reduced up to the
point where the cost of additional abatement exceeds the decrease in
damages resulting from that additional abatement.
In order to define this optimum, a composite cost of abatement
function for all emitters must be constructed. This function must be
derived from the individual cost of abatement functions in a special
way if it is going to represent the minimum cost locus for each level
3. Wright, supra note 1, at 67.
4. Wright, supra note 1, at 64.
5. Wright, supra note 1, at 71. Wright refers to the sufferer damage functions of individual polluters. But if these damage functions are non-linear so is the total damage function.
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of total abatement. As abatement is increased from the zero level,
efficiency requires that abatement begin with the lowest cost source
of abatement and proceed to the highest. Thus, if polluters have
different cost of abatement schedules, efficiency requires that the
marginal cost of abatement be the same for each polluter at each
successive level of total abatement. This implies that the levels of
abatement for different polluters will differ according to their
respective cost of abatement functions.
The imposition of a constant per unit tax on pollutants emitted
insures that pollution will be abated according to this marginal rule.
Each polluter will automatically equate the tax with his marginal
cost of abatement. If the tax rate is set properly, the optimal level of
pollution can be achieved by a single tax. Thus, unlike Wright's incorrect analysis, a single tax can be an optimal tax.
It is not difficult to show that in this situation a corrective tax is
always superior to the equiproportionate abatement rule.' Let us
suppose we have an air shed containing two firms, A and B, which
produce air pollution. These firms are assumed to be of equal size
and emit the same kind of pollutant. They are assumed to have cost
of abatement (C) schedules 7 described by
CA = 2aaqx2

CB = aaqx2

where x is the percent of pollution abated, q is the level of output
for the firm, a is the amount of pollutant per unit of output before
abatement, and a is a constant which depends only on the level of
technology in pollution abatement. Since these firms are assumed to
be of equal size, the product aq is the same for each, and I make the
additional simplifying assumption that the firms do not change their
size throughout the analysis. The only difference between these two
firms is that the technology of pollution abatement for firm A is
twice as costly (2a vs. a) as for firm B.
Now suppose a unit tax is levied on the amount of pollutant not
abated by each firm. The amount of tax collected from each is given
by
T = taq(1-x/100)
6. This conclusion is certainly not novel. See Crocker and Rogers, supra note 2, at

121-22.
7. While this particular form for the cost of abatement function has intuitive appeal, it
has some basis in fact. See A. Kneese and B. Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics,
Technology, Institutions 61 (1968), for an example of a cost of abatement function which is
similar. The cost of abatement function assumed is consistent with that implied by Wright's
MCS curve.
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where t is the tax rate per unit of pollution. After the tax the total
cost of abatement for the firm is the sum of C and T, or (for firm B,
for example)
=

=

taq

2

C' = C+T = aaqx-

100 x+taq

and similarly for firm A. The optimum level of abatement (x*), i.e.,
the minimum of C', and the corresponding direct cost of abatement
(C) for each firm is
t
t
x* = 0 0
XX = t
B400a2 a

CA

B

t 2 aq4

8.10 a

=

t2 aq
4 10'a

Thus, assuming that t has been set correctly by the PCB, firm B will
engage in twice as much abatement and spend twice as much on
abatement as firm A. A check shows the marginal cost of abatement
to be the same for each firm at this point. Total expenditure by both
firms on 3x*/2 percent of total pollution abated is

CA + B

=

3t 2 aq
8.10'ax

Now suppose the PCB tries to abate the same percent of pollution
(3x */2) by forcing each firm to reduce its pollution by this percent This is the equiproportionate abatement rule. In this case

18t 2 aq
CA - 64.10 4 a

B

9t 2 aq
-10'

a

and the total cost of the same amount of abatement would be

CA + B

=

27t 2 aq
64.104a

Thus, the equiproportionate abatement rule is about 12.5% more
expensive than a corrective tax which achieves the same amount of
abatement. In addition, the corrective tax will raise
TA + B

=

taq(2

-

3t

dollars of tax revenue.
In the last two sections of his paper, Wright correctly argues that
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the choice among pollution control methods may depend on the
relative administrative costs of regulation. No one would argue with
this conclusion.
My own sympathy still lies with the corrective tax approach, since
my hunch is that administrative costs will not vary much among
alternative methods. At a minimum, no matter which method of
control is used, the optimal level of pollution still is going to have to
be estimated (taking into account the costs of estimation), and the
level of pollution will still have to be monitored in some manner.
In discussing the problems of implementing an optimal program,
one point is frequently overlooked: there is no reason why all problems have to be solved ex ante. It is clearly myopic to demand
perfect knowledge, and certainty, before we embark on a pollution
abatement program. I would argue that we should pick the approach
which in the end seems to have the best hope of working out effectively, and then proceed to grope our way along, learning as we
go. Since the idea of corrective taxes has such a strong place in
welfare economics, I would argue that this is the way we ought to
proceed.
At the very least, Wright has not convinced me that corrective
taxes are more costly to administer than other methods of control.
He argues that some of the obvious inefficiencies of input standards
may be more than offset by the low administrative cost of checking
on their compliance. However, if it is indeed cheaper to police pollution abatement by checking on the inputs used, then I would argue
that this administrative device should be employed even if a corrective tax were the method of ultimate control. We should not
confuse metering devices with controls.
Among the many arguments for corrective taxes,8 I would like to
emphasize two which are infrequently heard: (a) corrective taxes
provide an efficient source of revenue for the pollution control board
which might not be available through normal revenue channels; and
(b) it is easily shown that the expected rate of improvement in
pollution abatement technology is higher when corrective taxes are
used.
One of the routine conclusions of standard welfare theory is that
most taxes impose welfare losses on the economy by distorting the
efficient allocation of resources. The same cannot be said for corrective pollution taxes. To the extent that such taxes replace other
taxes, the dead-weight loss due to these other taxes will be lessened. 9
In addition, it is my casual impression (and I recognize it as such)
8. Id. at ch. 9, for a summary of the advantages of the corrective tax approach.
9. Id. at 173-74.
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that one of the real bottlenecks preventing the implementation and
operation of efficient pollution abatement programs is the shortage
of revenue appropriations. Of course, it could be argued that the
political mechanism is working efficiently; my impression is that it is
not. Pollution abatement programs which are self-funding have, I
believe, a better chance of being implemented quickly and efficiently.
One of the reasons why our level of technology in pollution abatement is rather low is because there has been too low a rate of investment in abatement research and development; and this, in turn, has
been because there has been little private economic incentive to
undertake such investment. I would argue that one of the primary
criteria for choosing among abatement methods should be how much
economic incentive is given for improvements in abatement technology.
Few, including Wright, would argue that input standards rank high
on this score. The firm under input standards is locked into a technological straight jacket and has little economic incentive to employ
either the most efficient methods available or to search for new,
more efficient, methods of abatement.
Emission standards, like the equiproporationate abatement rule,
are better since they allow the firm to employ the most efficient
abatement methods available. In addition, if the firm can develop
more efficient methods of abatement it will reap the rewards (lower
costs) of doing so; some economic incentive is provided for investment in research and development of abatement technology.
However, it is clear that the economic incentive to invest in technological improvements is even greater if corrective taxes are the
method of control. Consider the case of firm B in the previous
example. If this firm is operating under emission standards and has
t
abated pollution by x - 200a percent, then its total costs of abatement are described by the right hand equation in (1). If this firm
develops a method of abatement which halves the cost of abatement
(from a to /2 a) then its cost reduction will be
t aq
.1Oaq
8
=
AC B
if the firm stayed at the same level of abatement after the innovation (it would have no reason to increase its abatement unless the
PCB changed the emission standards).
On the other hand, this same firm with a corrective tax on its
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emissions would evaluate the benefits of a technological improvement on the basis of equation (3). In this case, when the innovation
halves the cost of abatement, the firm will automatically increase its
) and experience a reduclevel of abatement (from t- - to
t
to
equal
tion in costs
t2 aq4
AC B - 410
a
which is twice as large as the cost reduction to the firm under emission standards. In addition, it is relatively easy to show that if the
PCB reacts to the improvements in abatement technology, it will
raise the emission standards in the former case and lower the tax rate
in the latter; this will raise the cost reduction to the firm operating
under emission standards compared to the figures in the two above
equations. This tends to increase the incentive advantage of the corrective tax.1 0
The reason the rewards for innovation are higher where corrective
taxes are used is that the innovating firm will experience a reduction
in both its tax liability and in its direct cost of abatement. Under the
emission standards only the latter will be reduced. This, of course,
amounts to a subsidy to the innovating firm under a corrective tax
since other taxes will have to be raised to offset the loss in pollution
tax collections. This could be economically inefficient. However, my
feeling is that an improvement in abatement technology would yield
substantial external economies, and therefore it would be economically efficient to subsidize such activity.
Thus, to the extent that the rate of change of abatement technology is dependent on the economic rewards to research and development it will improve faster under a corrective tax than under
emission standards.
In my view, the result of all this is that corrective taxes can play
an effective and efficient role in controlling pollution. At the very
least, they could be used with other kinds of control such as emission
standards. Of course, I would not argue that corrective taxes are the
best way to control all forms of pollution.' 1 But clearly they could
play a much greater role than they do presently.
10. For a more detailed analysis, see J. Wenders, Analytics of a Corrective Pollution Tax,
paper presented to the Western Econ. Ass'n, Econ. of Pollution Section (1971) (mimeograph copies available from author).
11. For instance, noise pollution might be particularly hard to handle by corrective
taxes. Although I can see no reason why motor vehicle taxes, especially for trucks and
motorcycles, could not be levied in proportion to their exhaust and noise pollution capabilities.

